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Appropriateness of carePaying hospitals for quality: can we buy
better care?
Jane P Hall, Kees C van GoolSummaryhe ideaofpayingmore for better quality care andpaying less
(or not at all) for poor quality care appears inherently sen-  Economic theory predicts that changing financial rewards will
change behaviour. This is valid in terms of service use; higher
costs reduce health care use.
 It should follow that paying more for quality should improve
quality; however, the research evidence thus far is equivocal,
particularly in terms of better health outcomes. One reason
is that “financial incentives” encompass a range of payment
types and sizes of reward.
 The design of financial incentives should take into account
the desired change and the context of existing payment
structures, as well as other strategies for improving quality;
further, financial incentives should be fair in rewarding effort.
 Financial incentives may have unintended consequences,
including rewarding hospitals for selecting patients with lower
risks, diverting attention from theoverall patient population to
specific conditions, gaming, and “crowding out” or displacing
intrinsic motivation.
 Managers and clinicians can only respond to financial
incentives if they have the data, tools and skills to effect
changes.
 Australia should not adoptwidespread use of financial incentives
for improving quality in health care without careful consideration
of their design andcontext, thepotential for unintendedeffects
(particularlybeyond their immediate targets), andevaluationof
outcomes. The relative cost-effectiveness of financial incentives
compared with, or in concert with, other strategies should also
be considered.
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16T sible, and has motivated several attempts to introduce
financial incentives for improving the quality of health care. These
range from bonus payments to hospitals that meet specified clinical
indicators for particular conditions (Queensland and Western
Australia are currently implementing such schemes) or paying for
structures that encourage quality (including higher payments for
achieving accreditation), to penalties for poor quality, such as
withholding payment for “never ever events” or shocking medical
errors, such as wrong site surgery (as applied in the United
Kingdom and by the United States Centers for Medicaid and
Medicare Services).1,2 Activity-based funding for hospital care is
widely used across the world, and quality payments are generally
applied as adjustments to the case payments. Financial incentives
that reward quality are also applied in primary care, but this article
will focus on hospitals.
Two key questions must be considered when thinking about
paying for quality. The first is whether the standard case payment
is inadequate for providing quality care; that is, whether appro-
priate quality care, even when supplied efficiently, simply costs
more than the case payment. The second is whether the use of
rewards (and penalties)will encouragemore appropriate or higher
quality care. Any use of payments or other incentives obviously
requires a clear definition of appropriate quality.
The first question involves the concern that quality could be
actively constrained by not paying enough for care. There can
be no sensible argument in support of paying too little to achieve
appropriate quality; the question is whether it is likely to happen.
In Australia, the casemix price paid through activity-based
funding is based on the analysis of existing cost data supplied
by public hospitals in all states and territories. Unless the present
quality of care is significantly lower than appropriate, the
national price will therefore reflect adequate care. This could
change with technological advances or new evidence about
clinical effectiveness. Incremental change is incorporated by reg-
ular revisions of casemix classifications and price. Even a major
shock in terms of technological progress or additional evidence is
likely to be focused on a particular case type, so that the impact
on total hospital revenue would be marginal and corrected within
a short period of time. While arbitrary cuts can be made by
funders to the national price, these would not be a cost-based
determination.
The second question is both more interesting and more
challenging. Financial incentives that target health care use are
generally effective, consistent with economic theory. It should
follow that aligning incentives with quality improvement should
enhance the quality of care. Evidence collectedover thepast decade
has been disappointing in this respect,3,4 andmore recent critiques
are nomore encouraging in terms of their finding improved health
outcomes.5 One reason for these disappointing findings is that
financial incentives are not precise, and there are wide differences
in the characteristics and the contexts of the different programs.Centre for Health Economics Research and Evaluation (CHERE), University of TechnologyFor example, incentives may be positive (extra payments) or
negative (reducing or withholding payments). The incentives
might apply at thehospital level, benefiting thehospital budget as a
whole; at a clinical department level, benefiting the departmental
budget; or be directed to individual clinicians, in cash or in kind.
The size of the incentive ranges from token payments to substantial
funding. This would make it difficult to generalise findings about
outcomes, even if there were a series of rigorous evaluations. Any
design or evaluation should therefore start by consideringwhether
the financial incentive is well targeted and appropriate for the
behaviour it is trying to change.
Financial incentives can be applied to hospital-level indicators
that encompass all conditions, or be targeted at particular condi-
tions. Targeting a particular condition is more precise, but loses
the scope of the entire patient population. Even a high volume
condition affects a small proportion of the patient population,
so that a targeted program will achieve only a limited overall
impact.
Incentives can be directed to reward either better outcomes or
improved processes of care. While better health outcomes for
patients are undoubtedly the desired end, good quality care
does not guarantee a better outcome for the individual. Many
factors other than the processes of care influence outcomes, and
there is always an element of chance. Further, some outcomesSydney, Sydney, NSW. Jane.Hall@chere.uts.edu.au j doi: 10.5694/mja15.01110
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S28may not be experienced until years after care has been
delivered.
The economic principle underlying the design of payment schemes
is that the funder should reward effort that promotes the interests
of the funder. This requires that the hospital, department or clini-
cian is rewarded forwhat they do and for how theymanage factors
within their control. Not surprisingly,most financial incentives are
therefore applied to improving processes of care. However, to
avoid losing sight of the desired better outcomes, evidence that
improving the specified processes leads to better outcomes is
generally required.
Establishing the evidence base is challenging. Hospitals are
complex organisations and hospital care typically involves a va-
riety of clinicians and diagnostic and treatment modalities. The
links between incentive, process and health outcome depend on
the actions and interactions of many different players.
As stated earlier, a performance payment alone does not achieve
anything. Generally, a specific payment is grafted onto an existing
payment scheme; and, unsurprisingly, what works in one context
or in one organisational and funding model cannot necessarily be
extrapolated to another. For example, whether funders and
hospitals are operating in a competitive market or in a centrally
controlled system will affect how a pay-for-performance model
works. Additional payments grafted onto a population-funded
model would be expected to have a different impact to paying
the same reward as an adjustment of activity-based funding.
Further, incentives are complex and encompass more than finan-
cial rewards. Professional status, striving for excellence, and
effective leadership can each influence behaviour.6
Evidence of no benefit is not the same as no evidence of benefit. The
first means that there is evidence that an intervention is not effec-
tive; the second that the necessary research has not been
undertaken. Evenwithout strong evidence of improved outcomes,
some people would argue that rewarding good quality processes
is, in itself, valuable because quality should be encouraged, and
higher quality is more likely to improve than to harm outcomes.
However, it is important to first ask whether there could be
unintended consequences of payment schemes, and the answer is
unequivocally: yes.
The initial effect of a payment incentive is to focus attention. Some
reward payments are too small or too cumbersome for potential re-
cipients to claim, making them ineffective. Where the incentive is
sufficiently strong, the attention of management will be focused on
how tomaximise the rewards.While thiswill improve themeasured
processes of care, it will also draw attention away from other prob-
lems. It is difficult to establish what the opportunity cost will be, but
improvedperformance inone aspect of caremaycomeat the expense
of foregone improvements, or even deteriorations, elsewhere.
Incentives can also have perverse effects by encouraging gaming.
This can involve changing how treatment processes are counted,
such as coding conditions as more complex case types; raising the
threshold for recognisinghospital-acquired conditions; re-defining
amultidisciplinary case conference. This effect can bemitigated by
monitoring and auditing processes. One of the more undesirable
effects is patient selection: if there is a strong incentive to choose less
complex patients, an unintended effect is that hospitalsmay favour
easier cases, so that patients in greater need find it difficult to
receive treatment. This is more challenging to monitor.
More significant is the problem of intrinsic and extrinsic motiva-
tion, which tends to be little discussed in this context. Intrinsicmotivation is complex andpowerful, and is vital inhealth care: care
providers are motivated by doing their job well, caring for their
patients, and gaining the respect of their peers. Extrinsic
motivation relates to behaviour that is driven by external rewards;
financial incentives are clearly an important form of extrinsic
motivation. Not only do extrinsic motivators lose their effective-
ness over time, however, they can “crowdout” or displace intrinsic
motivation. As a result, the rewarded behaviour is likely to fade
once the reward is removed, even among thosewhoweredoing the
right thing before the incentive is introduced.7
Any discussion of financial incentives should also address the notion
of purchasing health gains. This is not as simple as it first seems. Let
us assume that theAustralian social value, orwillingness to pay for a
degree of health gain as measured in quality-adjusted life-years
(QALYs), is about $75 000 (a reasonable estimate based on
Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee determinations8). It
does not follow that the Australian health care system should spend
$75 000 for every QALY gained; this would certainly not maximise
the health outcomes achievedby its budget.9 Specific health gains are
delivered at a range of prices; for example, if it cost $15 000perQALY
for aparticular treatment, paying$75 000 represents anoverpayment
of $60 000, or a loss of 4 QALYs. Maximising health outcomes
requires starting with the lowest cost per QALY, and adding more
expensive treatments until the upper budgetary limit, or the
maximum social willingness to pay for a QALY, is reached.
Translated into hospital funding, this means not paying the same
price for each unit of health gain. Itmeans paying the efficient price
for each treatment for each case type, up to the maximum social
willingness to pay. It requires an umpire to set the efficient price for
a case type, and a different perspective for determining whether
this represents value for money. According to this argument, the
price paid should reflect the efficient cost of production, but the
volume of cases should be managed separately. The efficient price
is intended to provide the incentive for better cost control, partic-
ularly in high cost hospitals. It is aimed at improving technical
efficiency; that is, maximising the output for a given input.
Finally, getting the incentives to be consistentwith thedesired ends
is only part of the challenge. Managers, clinicians and others
involved in health caremaybe offered the “right” incentives, but, if
they lack the skills and tools to identify what and how to effect
change, they are powerless to respond.10
Financial incentives used alone are a blunt instrument. Their
effectiveness will depend on the size and design of the reward or
penalty, and also on how they reinforce (or are inconsistent with)
other signals in the operating environment. It is therefore not
surprising that it is difficult to reach general conclusions about
their usefulness. It is even more difficult to reach conclusions
about their relative cost-effectiveness comparedwith alternative
approaches. Further, financial incentives have an opportunity
cost, diverting funds and attention from other problems. Given
what is known and what is still uncertain, it would be unwise to
rush into their widespread use as a strategy for improving the
quality of health care in Australia. Instead, they should be
applied cautiously, with careful consideration of design and
context and of the potential for unintended effects, and with
evaluation of outcomes.
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